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Introduction 
Of Parliaments and Kings: 
The Origins of Monarchy and the 
Sovereign-Subject Compact in the English 
Middle Ages (to 1400) 
The purpose of this study is to examine the intersection between early modem 
political thought, the history that produced the late Tudor and early Stuart 
monarchies, and the critical interrogation of both taking place on the public 
theatrical stage. The plays I examine here are those which rely on chronicle 
histories for their source materials; are set in England, Scotland, or Wales; focus 
primarily on governance and sovereignty; and whose interest in history is didactic 
and actively political. Although, as Irving Rihner has explained, early modems 
had a different conception of "history" than contemporary scholars in terms of 
factuality, I have excluded those plays grounded primarily in legend, such as 
William Shakespeare's King Lear, Thomas Norton and Thomas Sackville's 
Gorboduc, or William Rowley's Birth of Merlin. 1 
Any examination of the sociopolitical implications of sovereignty in the 
history plays written and produced during the Elizabethan, Jacobean, and Caroline 
periods must take into consideration the political traditions that led to their 
production. Before the accession of Henry VII, England's understanding of rule 
was rooted in what we today might describe as populism augmented by a belief in 
the metaphysical superiority of the sovereign, encapsulated in what were referred 
to as common law and the ancient constitution. Current scholarship, particularly 
of early modem drama and literature, often tends to associate absolutism with an 
older, medieval era, and populism with the Rousseauian social contract of the mid-
eighteenth century. However, as Robert Eccleshall explains, both forms sprang from 
the same surprisingly progressive ideological construct based on ancient traditions 
founded in both parochial tribalism and proto-imperialism.2 These common roots 
reemerged in later claims for both absolutism and limited monarchism, producing 
the theoretical debates at the heart of early modem politics. 
1 Irving Rihner defines history plays as those featuring "material drawn from national 
chronicles and assumed by the dramatist to be true, whether in the light of our modern 
knowledge they be true or not" (The English History Play in the Age of Shakespeare 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957], 26). 
2 Robert Eccleshall, Order and Reason in Politics: Theories of Absolute and Limited 
Monarchy in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 2. 
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Gods, Kings, and Communitas 
Both limited and absolute monarchies claimed a foundation in the divine, 
whether directly endowed by a god or gods, or endorsed through popular election 
or sanction. Throughout ancient and medieval Europe, kings were thought to 
possess a connection to or aspect of the supernatural, termed Heil by Germanic 
peoples.3 This concept drew upon an understanding shared with the ancient Norse 
and early Anglo-Saxons of "luck" as a characteristic rather than an indicator of 
one's relationship to external forces-individuals in possession of "luck" had an 
increased likelihood of success in their endeavors because they were blessed.4 
This sense of Heil came to be associated with the Christian God and holiness in 
the high middle ages, a theoretical precursor to divine right.5 
Belief in the connection between king and God, which arose in the eleventh 
through the thirteenth centuries from popular belief that the monarch had a closer 
connection to divinity, reflected the metaphoric understanding of God himself as 
a monarch (the King of Kings) and of the world as a reflection of divine law. 
Additionally, it produced the understanding that the monarch served as the 
community's representative to those higher powers in transactional terms. It was 
the king's duty to be the symbolic manifestation of his people's needs and will, a 
characterization that gave rise to the common use of the "royal we" as a linguistic 
signifier of the king's collective identity. 
As the representative of the nation as a whole, the monarch was responsible for 
embodying the collective identity of the nation; this understanding also worked in 
reverse, and the populace came to expect that it was also an extension of its king. 
This contributed significantly to both a sense of proto-nationalism which arose at 
this juncture in history and also to the understanding of the mutual reliance of both 
sovereign and subjects upon each other. The role of king as the collective head-a 
bodily metaphor common to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-was that of 
the proverbial "first among equals," both greater than and one among his subjects. 
During this period, tribalism produced in burgeoning medieval nation-states an 
awareness of the self as a part of a unified national whole that encompassed all 
levels of the social hierarchy up to and including the king. 
But despite his inclusion in this political-and often religious-communitas, the 
monarch was nevertheless offset from the collective by virtue of his transactional 
link to the divine. This separation created the sense that the monarch served as the 
head of the nation as a unit, typically characterized in familial terms. Henry Allen 
Myers notes that 
3 For the sake of brevity, I have chosen to default to the male pronoun since, until the 
sixteenth century, England was ruled almost exclusively by male monarchs, and theories of 
sovereignty universally reflected a presumption of male rule. 
4 Bettina Sejbjerg Sommer, "The Norse Concept of Luck," Scandinavian Studies 79, 
no. 3 (2007): 275. One of the Norse words for this type ofluck was Heil/, indicating either 
that it had a common origin with the Germanic term or that the Norse term is the origin for 
the Germanic concept (279). 
5 Henry Allen Myers, Medieval Kingship (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1982), 164. 
Introduction 
The English term "king" (Old English cyning) derives, as do its cognates in 
other Germanic languages, from "kin" (cyn). The king was the man whose Heil 
was sufficiently impressive to a group who considered themselves kin to each 
other that they saw him as mediating for all of them with the powers of light 
and darkness. 6 
3 
As mediator, the king was under obligation to act as intercessory for the nation on 
both material and spiritual levels. His primary responsibility was the safety and 
security of the realm-and, by extension, of its people. This belief was reiterated 
by John of Salisbury (1159), who augmented the obligation of the monarch to 
ensure peace with the belief that he was also required to administer justice.7 
Linked to his responsibilities of security and prosperity was the reciprocal duty 
of atonement if these goals could not be achieved. Sergio Bertelli explains that 
"Like a priest, the king was both the advocate of his people before heaven and 
the sacrificial hostage of heaven among his people. He assumed the traits of a 
scapegoat for the sins of his subjects."8 This notion of"scapegoating" meant that 
the monarch could be expected to render sacrifice-spiritual, material, and even 
bodily-for the common weal. 
King, Common Law, and the Ancient Constitution 
The monarch's singular responsibility for the collective state relied on the duality of 
the king as both of and above the national communitas, reflected in the perception 
of the monarch's relationship to the law. In The Beast and the Sovereign, Jacques 
Derrida describes the sovereign as both of the law and "outside-the-law": 
Being-outside-the-law can, no doubt, on the one hand (and this is the figure of 
sovereignty), take the form of being-above-the-law, and therefore take the form 
of the Law itself, of the origin of laws, the guarantor oflaws, as though the Law, 
with a capital L, the condition of the law, were before, above, and therefore 
outside the law, external or even heterogeneous to the law.9 
By being both "outside-the-law" and being "the Law itself," the monarch serves as 
the embodiment of the rules that bind communitas, even as he is himself a member 
of that communitas and is thus also bound to the law. 
Because the medieval monarch was the recorder of law, he came to be 
associated not only with its documentation, but with its production on all levels, 
leading to his equation with law itself. However, as J.W. Gough observes, "Law, 
6 Myers, 3. 
7 Myers, 247. 
8 Sergio Bertelli, The Kings Body: Sacred Rituals of Power in Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe, trans. R. Burr Litchfield (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 200 I), 22. 
9 Jacques Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, vol. I 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 17. 
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in the earliest times barely distinguishable from custom, was in medieval thought 
prior to rather than the creature of government; the whole people, in some sense, 
was its repository, and though the king's function was to declare it, it was not in 
his power to manufacture it arbitrarily."10 This meant that even though the king 
was the recorder of the law, he was not its ultimate author, that role being reserved 
for God. This idea persevered throughout the middle ages, surfacing in John 
Fortescue's treatise to Prince Edward, son of Henry VI, The Difference Between 
an Absolute and Limited Monarchy, and again in Richard Hooker's Of the Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity under Elizabeth. 11 For despite being the origin of the law-or, 
at least, of some law-the monarch was nevertheless widely considered subject to 
"natural law," or the law of God, which the king could neither make nor unmake. 12 
The English understanding of this relationship between king and law made a 
very particular distinction between natural, "common" law and recorded, statute 
law. Medieval English society contained both the king's recorded laws, or statutes, 
and the natural, common law. Legalists up until-and, indeed, throughout-the 
early modem period preferred to rely upon ancient tradition rather than recent 
historical precedence, rarely, if ever, making reference even to statutes from the 
sixteenth century.13 Instead, comnion law drew upon the immemorial construct 
of an Unrecorded, ancient constitution as the basis for its authority. Howell A. 
Lloyd remarks that it is important to remember that the term "constitution" had a 
different connotation for early modems, meaning "an explicit declaration of law 
by the prime political authority." 14 This meant, then, that the ancient constitution, 
unwritten as it was, was seen as tantamount to "an explicit declaration" of God and 
in accordance with natural law, a unique claim in which the law's legitimacy relied 
upon the fact that it was unwritten; Glenn Burgess explains: 
the common law, and consequently the ancient constitution itself, were customary. 
By this was meant two things: first, that English common law was unwritten (lex 
non scripta), not written as the Roman law was .... Thus common law became 
seen as the national law of England, yet was unusual in being (in origin at least) 
unwritten. So, where did it come from? how was it known? The answer to this 
provided the second feature of the customary common law, it was immemorial.15 
10 J.W. Gough, The Social Contract: A Critical Study of Its Development, Second 
Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 26. 
11 Berte Iii, 3 8; Eccleshall, 148. 
12 Franklin Le Van Baumer, The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1966), 5. 
13 Howard Nenner, By Colour of Law: Legal Culture and Constitutional Politics in 
England, 1660-1689 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 14. 
14 Howell A. Lloyd, "Constitutionalism," in The Cambridge History of Political 
Thought 1450-1700, ed. J.H. Bums and Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 254. 
15 Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to 
English Political Thought, 1603-1642 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1993), 4. 
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In other words, the power of the ancient constitution-which drew on the traditions 
of ancient Britons rather than the Roman law upon which statutes were based-
was a product both of its inherent alliance with natural (God's) law and its intrinsic 
"Englishness." 
Derived from natural law, English common law set forth the assumed rights of 
and limitations upon both sovereign and subjects and took precedence over written 
law. The traditional nature of this legal practice permitted the continuation of the 
ancient constitution through the Norman conquest, allowing for sociopolitical 
continuity through the religious and governmental upheavals of the medieval and 
early modem periods. And because of its power to maintain an ideological foothold, 
the ancient constitution-and the common law that claimed it as a foundation-
became the framework to which later proponents of limited monarchy turned for 
legal justification. 
Foremost among the rights claimed by subjects under common law were those 
of property, including land, movables, and monetary wealth. 16 The inviolability 
of these rights formed the basis of Parliamentary approval for taxation: the king 
needed the consent of the people qua Parliament to levy taxes, a legal requirement 
that formed the basis for many Parliamentary disputes throughout the medieval 
and early modem eras.17 The expectation among both medievals and early 
modems was that the monarch was expected explicitly to defend those rights, 
whether against others within the nation or against threat of invasion from without. 
Because this defense was a "duty" of the monarch, a king who himself violated 
these rights could expect not only resistance from Parliament, but also rebellion 
from his subjects. 
By extension, the laws governing the practice of how that property-owned 
or tenured-was transferred also formed a vital component of common law. The 
protections afforded to inheritance were intertwined with English political identity 
and extended beyond material property to include the rights of Parliamentary 
representation, courtly privilege, and political influence.18 The fact that the 
inheritance of the crown was governed by ~e same common law as any other 
position of property and political rank contributed significantly to the limitation 
of medieval English monarchy. John Neville Figgis, in his nineteenth-century 
exploration of absolutism, explains that 
It is only because the notions of public Jaw and sovereignty were as yet 
undeveloped that this [primogeniture] was possible. Because men cannot 
think of the king as other than a natural person, or of the rules governing the 
succession except as a part of the ordinary Jaw of inheritance, they were driven 
to assimilate the succession to the Crown to the succession to a fief. .The king 
16 Burgess, 142. 
17 Paul Birdsall, "'Non Obstante': A Study of the Dispensing Power of English 
Kings," in Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard Mel/wain, 
ed. Carl Wittke (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), 37. 
18 Nenner, 33. 
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was the landowner par excellence; his lands must descend by the same rules as 
those of other men. 19 
For Figgis, an ardent supporter of absolutism, this reliance in medieval England 
upon common law served as a political detriment because the parallel between the 
monarch as "landowner par excellence" and any other property-holder produced 
limitations on monarchical power. 
Nevertheless, the recognition of the similarity between inheritance 
and succession did not preclude others-such as Edmund Plowden-from 
distinguishing between them. Marie Axton observes that "To prove how radically 
royal succession differed from ordinary inheritance Plowden proposed legal cases 
and historical episodes showing the finality of a subject's death as opposed to the 
momentary disjunction of the king's body natural from the body politic which was 
then instantaneously vested in his successor."20 The difference, in other words, 
between "an ordinary man" and the monarch was the understanding that the 
monarch was not a person in the same sense that an "ordinary man" was a person._ 
Monarchy was a role, and continued perpetually regardless of the individual who 
occupied it. 
King and Compact 
Despite this legal division, the monarchy was still held both subject to and 
accountable for the enforcement of common law throughout the medieval period. 
The similarities between the king's relationship to his subjects and that of any 
feudal lord to his vassals led to the understanding that the king had similar legal 
obligations. This both increased and limited monarchical power through the quasi-
contractual relationship between monarch as ultimate feudal lord and his subject-
vassals, which formed the basis for the unwritten, yet sacred compact between 
sovereign and subjects that underpinned sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
arguments for the right of popular rebellion, deposition, and even tyrannicide. 
Furthermore, this legal framework permitted a kind of fictional equality, 
according to Mervyn James: "Common wealth was rooted in a customary order 
handed down from the past which had the nature of law, defining the extent and 
limits even of the lord's authority, as well as the rights and duties of the tenant."21 
Although the reality of the lord-vassal relationship was based in a rigid hierarchy, 
the legalistic fiction behind that relationship produced an understanding that the 
submissive party would never be wholly deprived of rights. Since the monarch 
19 John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, ed. G.R. Elton, Second Edition 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 23. 
20 Marie Axton, The Queen~ Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession 
(London: Royal Historical Society, 1977), 27-28. 
21 
.Mervyn James, Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England 
(Cambndge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 284. 
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was conceived as the ultimate liege-lord, the same legal restrictions applied; the 
king was accountable to and responsible for the entire common wealth: nobles, 
commons, lands, and capital. 
This relationship-which I will henceforth term the "sovereign-subject 
compact"-arose out of the mutual obligations of common law and the ancient 
constitution and was symbolized in the coronation oath. The sovereign-subject 
compact-like common law and the ancient constitution-is unwritten and 
immemorial; it binds the role of the sovereign to the national communitas. 
Legalistically, it functioned as an implied contract of rights and responsibilities, 
and permitted extreme action on the part of subjects whose common law rights had 
been violated by their king, as R.H. Wells explains: "While strongly deprecating 
rebellion, medieval writers conceded that a king who violated his coronation oath 
could no longer expect obedience from his subjects."22 In other words, the subjects 
are held capable of judging the behaviors of their king, an ideology that naturally 
produces-as it did in England-the impetus to limit monarchical authority in 
favor of subjects' rights. 
The justification offered by legalists and political theorists alike for the 
limitations placed on the monarchy by the sovereign-subject compact may be 
found in the nation's foundational mythos. In nations evincing a sovereign-subject 
compact-like medieval England-the compact was predicated on the origin 
of the nation in the communitas rather than the king. Gough refers to this as an 
"original contract": 
the Gesellschaftsvertrag, or pacte d 'association-which supposes that a number 
of individuals, living in a "state of nature," agreed together to form an organized 
society ... This is a theory, then, of the origin of the state; it is commonly, though 
not necessarily, associated with the doctrine of"natural rights," which belonged 
to individual men as such, and of which they agreed by the contract to surrender 
some, in return for a guarantee of the remainder. 23 
The implications of this "original" sovereign-subject compact, as Jean Bethke 
Elshtain remarks, is "that this grant of authority is conditional."24 Because the 
communitas is seen as the source of the monarch's authority, it has the ability 
to limit or even rescind that authority as it sees fit, a sentiment articulated in the 
sixteenth-century tract Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos (1577) by Hubert Languet: 
"So, as kings are constituted by the people, it seems definitely to follow that the 
whole people fpopulus universus] is more powerful than the king."25 
22 Robin Headlam Wells, Shakespeare s Politics: A Contextual Introduction (London: 
A&C Black, 2009), 116. 
23 Gough, 2-3. 
24 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self, The Gifford Lectures 
(New York: Basic Books, 2008), 43. 
25 Hubert Languet, Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos, ed. and trans. George Garnett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 74. 
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The sovereign-subject compact required subjects' obedience as well as the 
monarch's compliance. If subjects committed treason without adequate reason, the 
monarch was justified in seizing their property or issuing warrants for their arrest, 
imprisonment, and even execution. If, on the other hand, the monarch violated 
this compact, his subjects were no longer obligated to obey or revere him, and 
(depending on the severity of the violation) may even justify rebellion, deposition, 
and regicide.26 The reciprocity of this implicit agreement, argues Nenner, implies 
its contractual nature: 
If a binding obligation was attempted on one side but was absent on the other, 
the agreement would be merely illusory. It would not, in fact, be a contract. This 
is why it was argued that the people, as a party to the original contract, could not 
promise to be bound to the terms of the agreement if the king chose not to be. 27 
Put simply, because both the monarch and subjects were expected to fulfill their 
side of the implied bargain, the sovereign-subject compact functioned as legally 
binding. 
This understanding of sovereign accountability was being espoused in England 
before the Norman conquest, arid the sentiment continued to place ideological 
and practical limitations on monarchical power up to the Revolution, in spite of 
some monarchs' attempts to resist them.28 This sense of monarchical obligation 
argued that even regicide itself was justifiable when committed in the name of the 
common weal; the Shaftesbury Papers argue this case, claiming that "For though 
this wounds, yet it destroyes not the government; for though the King is killed in 
his naturall capacity; yet he dies not in his politique as King; for by the demise of 
the King, another immediately succeeds."29 It is important to note, however, that 
in order to be legally permissible, regicide had to be the only means to secure the 
safety and dignity of the realm, as well as be justified by the monarch's neglect 
or abuse of common law and communitas. This meant, J.P. Sommerville notes, 
that "there was little point in advocating resistance to the king unless it had 
some chance of success. Those who did admit the legitimacy of resistance were 
26 James, 327, 374. 
27 Nenner, 40. 
28 Manegold of Lautenbach argued in the eleventh century that "If a king violates 
the compact under which he was elected (si quando pactum, quo eligitur, infringit), and 
disturbs and confounds what it was his business to set in order, the people is justly and 
reasonably absolved from its allegiance, since he was the first to break that faith which 
bound them together (quipped cum fidem prior ipse deseruerit, que alterutrum altero 
.fidelitate colligavit). The people never binds itself by an oath to obey a ruler who is 
possessed by fury, and is under no obligation to follow such a man wherever his madness 
drives him" (Gough, 30). John of Salisbury echoed the sentiment in the twelfth century, 
Fortescue would repeat it again in the fifteenth, and Languet, Robert Persons, Christopher 
?o?dman, and other~ in the sixteenth would continue the tradition in spite of monarchical 
ms1stence on absolutism during the Tudor dynasty under Henry VII Henry VIII Edward 
VI, Mary, and Elizabeth. ' ' 
29 
The Shaftesbury Papers, Public Records Office (30/24/6B/425), qtd. in Nenner, 89. 
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unanimous in declaring that it had to take place on public, not private authority."30 
Resistance required public authority because the sovereign-subject compact itself 
was a public agreement between the communitas and the position, rather than the 
person, of the king. 
The significance of the sovereign-subject compact in England, particularly 
when compared with more absolute continental monarchies, was its emphasis on 
cooperative governance. In order to assure that the terms of the sovereign-subject 
compact were properly maintained, the monarch was expected to rule with the 
assistance of his subjects. The development of communal policymaking-which 
culminated in the king-in-Parliament of the late medieval period-was the natural 
product of avoiding tyranny.31 Put explicitly, Nenner observes, "Contract was 
England's guarantee against absolutism. As long as a compact, any compact, 
existed between king and people, there would be some restraint upon the freedom 
of the sovereign."32 This notion of "restraint" or limitation on monarchical power 
formed the crux of nearly every internal governmental dispute in England, and 
ultimately produced the period of post-Wars of the Roses absolutism that, in tum, 
culminated in the legal execution of an anointed English king. 
English Tradition and Limited Sovereignty 
Early English traditions were the product of Roman influence, but were more the 
consequence of the rejection of Roman rule than an embrasure of Roman law and 
hierarchy. David Starkey notes that the rejection of Roman practice by the Anglo-
Saxons made the English monarchy-and common law--distinctive: "There is, 
uniquely in the Western Empire, an absolute rupture between the Roman province 
of Britannia and the eventual successor-state of Anglo-Saxon England."33 Anglo-
Saxon traditions and institutions persevered even through the Norman conquest, 
and, in fact, were demanded by the earls in their agreement to crown Henry I in 
llOO. Anglo-Saxon society was, broadly speaking, participatory, a unique system 
containing "a powerful and effective monarchy at the centre with institutions of 
local government which required-and got_.:_the active involvement of most free 
men."34 The elements present in Anglo-Saxon Wessex, a participatory government 
with a centralized monarchy that not only allowed but demanded subject 
involvement, became the staples of later English common law, providing the basis 
for arguments against absolutist monarchy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
By the late ninth century, monarchy in England was established enough to 
produce a sense of English proto-nationalism rooted in the belief that "Cyning 
30 Johann P. Sommerville, Royalists and Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England 
1603-1640, Second Edition (London: Longman, 1999), 75. 
31 Eccleshall, 40-41. 
32 Nenner, 40. 
33 David Starkey, Crown and Country: The Kings & Queens of England: A History 
(London: HarperPress, 2006), 4. 
34 Starkey, Crown, 19. 
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sceal rice healdan (a king must protect his kingdom)."35 Furthermore, there was 
a historical precedent for election-or at least for performative designation-in 
Anglo-Saxon tradition; H.R. Loynremarks that "In all Anglo-Saxon communities-
as throughout the Germanic world-the general custom was for the man from 
the royal kin who was fittest to rule to be selected as successor."36 The concept 
of fitness is therefore integral to the ancient constitution; the next monarch was 
the nearest blood-kin who was also worthy of the crown. 37 The selection process 
produced a "government by consent, in which the leader is chosen by the people, 
or at least is answerable to them."38 
One of the earliest examples of subjects' interference with the powers of the 
monarchy may be found in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, dated 1014, under the 
governance of JEthelred (subsequently known as the Unready), what Starkey 
refers to as "the Anglo-Saxon Magna Carta."39 The Chronicle reads: 
Then all the councillors, both ordained and lay, advised that King ,.Ethelred 
should be sent for, and declared that no lord was dearer to them than their natural 
lord-if he would govern them more justly than he did before. Then the king 
sent his son Edward here with his messengers, and ordered [them] to greet all 
his nation, and said that he would be a gracious lord to them, and would improve 
each of the things which they all hated, and each of those things that were done 
or declared against him should be forgiven, on condition that they all resolutely 
and without treachery turned to him. And full friendship was secured with word 
and pledge on either side, and [they] declared every Danish king outlawed from 
England for ever. Then during that spring King ,.Ethelred came home to his own 
people, and he was gladly received by them all.40 
35 H.R. Loyn, The Governance of Anglo-Saxon England 500-1087 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1984), 12. 
36 Loyn, 15. 
37 Loyn notes that "How closely the kin was defined is not easy to estimate," but 
suggests that it was not restricted to primogeniture (15). 
38 Starkey, Crown, 24. 
39 Starkey, Crown, 69. 
40 Michael Swanton, ed., The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, trans. Michael Swanton 
(New York: Routledge, 1998), 145. Insertions in the original. The Old English reads: "py 
ilcan geare man hadode relfwig bisceop on Eoforwic to Lundenburuh on Sancta Iuliana 
mressedreg. se flota pa eall gecuron Cnut to cyninge. Pa rreddon pa witan ealle, gehadode 
lrewede, pret man refter pam cyninge repelrede sende, cwredon pret him nan hlaford leofra 
nrere ponne hyra gecynda hlaford, gif he hi rihtlicor healdan wolde ponne he rer dyde. 
Pa sende se cyning his sunu Eadweard hider mid his rerenddracan het gretan ealne his 
leodscype, cwre5 pret he him hold hlaford beon wolde, relc prera pinga betan pe hi ealle 
ascunodo~, relc para pinga forgyfon beon sceolde pe him gedon oMe cwreden wrere, wi5 
J:>am pe h1 ealle anrredlice butan swicdome to him gecyrdon. man pa fulne freondscipe 
gefrestnode mid worde mid wedde on regpre healfe, refre relcne Dreniscne cyning utlah of 
renglalande gecwredon. Pa com repelred cyning innan pam lrenctentid ham to his agenre 
J:>eode, he glredlice fram him eallum on fangen wres" (Manuscript D: Cotton Tiberius 
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The agreement between JEthelred and his counselors that he would "be a gracious 
lord" and "improve each of the things which they all hated" indicates the power of 
the counselors to place limitations upon JEthelred as king. The fact that JEthelred 
and his counselors cemented their contract ''with word and pledge on either side" 
indicates its mutuality, the sovereign-subject compact formalized in writing. 
This foundation of limited participatory governance relied upon the mutual 
powers of the monarch and the wit an, a consular body that provided the precedent 
for both Parliament and a powerful Privy Council. The role of the witan was both 
advisory and legislative, as Loyn explains: 
The witan was of course a royal council. Yet it could in moments of crisis 
acquire not only a dignity but a function of its own. On the death of a king the 
process of election was carried out through the witan ... Those who acquired the 
throne by conquest or by physical strength were most careful to gain the general 
assent of the witan.41 
The parallels between the later Parliament and the wit an are obvious, and the witan's 
duty of electing the new ruler even provided a conceptual basis for a sixteenth-
century proposition made by William Cecil Lord Burghley for a Great Council to 
serve the same purpose upon Elizabeth's death. The combination of these Anglo-
Saxon institutions with feudal Norman tradition formed the unique backbone of 
English common law and participatory monarchy for centuries to come. 
Following the death of Cnut's son Hardecnut in 1042, the witan chose 
JEthelred's son, Edward ("the Confessor"), to succeed.42 Edward had been raised 
in exile in Normandy, a fact that would ultimately smooth the transition to Norman 
rule following his own death early in 1066, although the feudal practices and 
customs he brought to England were not entirely welcomed by the Jarls who had 
risen to power under Cnut.43 Upon Edward's death, William of Normandy and 
Harold Godwinson both proclaimed themselves heir to the throne of England.44 
William of Poitiers recorded in The Deeds of William (1071) that William was 
the rightful heir and that "This insensate Englishman did not wait for the public 
choice, but breaking his oath, and with the support of a few ill-disposed partisans, 
he seized the throne of the best of kings on the very day of his funeral, and 
when all the people were bewailing their loss."45 That the chronicle records the 
B.iv, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: An Electronic Edition [vol. 4] literary edition, accessed 
March 14, 2014, http://asc.jebbo.co.uk/d/d-L.html). 
41 Loyn, 101. 
42 C. Warren Hollister, The Making of England: 55 B.C. to 1399, Seventh Edition 
(Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996), 94. 
43 Hollister, 95. 
44 Loyn, 97. 
45 William of Poitiers, "The Deeds of William (c. 1071). Background to the Norman 
Conquest, 1064-1066," in Documents in British History, Volume I: Early Times to 
1714, Second Edition, ed. Brian L. Blakeley and Jacquelin Collins (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1993), 33. 
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succession in tenns of "the public choice" emphasizes not only the importance, 
but also the continuance of the sovereign-subject compact in English rule, despite 
the transition from an ostensibly English to a Nonnan king. 
In ideological tenns, the notion that English law and governance were inherently 
Anglo-Saxon rather than Anglo-Nonnan-known as the "Nonnan Yoke"-argued 
that "Before 1066 the Anglo-Saxon inhabitants of this country lived as free and 
equal citizens, governing themselves through representative institutions. The 
Nonnan Conquest deprived them of this liberty, and established the tyranny of an 
alien King and landlords. They fought continuously to recover them, with varying 
success."46 Participatory and limited governance was seen as the true English form 
of rule, based upon the ancient unwritten constitution and reliant upon the tenets 
of common law. Therefore, any rejection of absolute monarchy was a rejection of 
a fonn of governance that was un-English, permanently linking limited monarchy 
with national identity. 
Anxiety about the "loss" of this pure (Anglo-Saxon) English identity grew 
out of a specifically English origin myth, which predated English law to before 
the invasion of the Romans or. the assertions of divine intercession in the Biblical 
new Testament. Derek Wilson explains that in Fortescue's narrative, common law 
"had been established, pure and entire, in 'Albion' by a band of heroes returning 
from the Trojan Wars, led by one Brute and therefore antedated not only Roman 
law (the basis of most continental legislation) but also those systems which drew 
their inspiration from the Christian Gospel."47 Although "Theories of lost rights, 
of a primitive happy state, have existed in nearly all communities," in England this 
"original state" of rights was aligned with the Anglo-Saxons or Arthurian Britain, 
rather than with an idyllic fictional locale (although those, like Arcadia or Eden, 
also existed).48 However, the prevalence of this attitude led "William [I] ... to use 
existing English institutions to the full," rather than supplanting them with his own 
Nonnan practices.49 
For my purposes, the next significant development in English sovereignty 
occurred with the accession of Henry I in 1100. What is notable about Henry I's 
accession is his coronation oath, written in response to his predecessor's continual 
attempts to seize lands from the heirs of earls and clergy upon their deaths: 
Neither sell nor put at farm nor, on the death of an archbishop, bishop, or abbot, 
take anything from a church's demesne or from its vassals during the interval 
before a successor is installed ... If any of my barons or earls or other tenants 
shall die, his heir shall not redeem his land as he did in my brother's time, but 
shall henceforth redeem it by a just and lawful relief.50 
46 Christopher Hill, Puritanism & Revolution: The English Revolution of the 17th 
Century (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), 57. 
47 Derek Wilson, In the Lions Court: Power, Ambition and Sudden Death in the Reign 
of Henry VJII (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 21. 
48 Hill, 50. 
49 Loyn, 183. 
50 Qtd. in Hollister, 132. 
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Although Henry I did not keep all of the promises contained in this oath, it 
nevertheless provides legal contractual precedent for the understanding of 
inheritance preserved in common law tradition.51 Moreover, Henry was specifically 
required to return England to the traditions observed under Edward the Confessor. 
His reign is noted as "the coming of age of the royal administration," the period 
when Anglo-Saxon and Norman traditions solidified into the institution of the 
English monarchy as it would persist into the fifteenth century.s2 
Based on Henry I's coronation oath, Magna Carta, established in 1215, went 
into much greater detail in terms of the king's obligations, subjects' rights, and 
their recourse if those rights were violated.s3 It reflected an ethos that was uniquely 
English, but applied a methodology (as a written and ratified contract) that had 
appeared elsewhere on the continent, namely in Germany, Italy, Hungary, and 
Sicily.s4 Elshtain observes that while Magna Carta was in some ways highly 
progressive, in other ways it was profoundly traditionalist: "The famous Magna 
Carta, one signpost on the road to freedom in the standard story, was a restorationist 
act, seeking to bind the king in the standard medieval ways."s5 Although the most 
commemorated, like later invocations of common law and the ancient constitution, 
Magna Carta was powerful because it drew upon a tradition of participatory 
government that formed the basis of later understandings of limited monarchy, 
republicanism, and even democracy. 
In the final clause of Magna Carta, the king agrees to submit himself to the 
judgment of his barons, who are permitted to elect representatives from among 
themselves for the express purpose of passing judgment on the king's ability to 
uphold Magna Carta and the rights contained therein. And if the king should fail 
both to uphold them and to subsequently address this failure, this baronial body, 
together with the community of the entire country, shall distress and injure us 
in all ways possible-namely, by capturing our castles, lands, and possessions 
and in all ways that they can-until they secure redress according to their own 
decision, saving our person and [the person] of our queen and [the persons] of 
si William I brought with him a continental understanding offeudalism that included 
primogeniture. Prior to this, widows, daughters, and non-eldest sons were able to inherit 
land based on the will of the original landowner (Clayton Roberts and David Roberts, 
A History of England: Prehistory to 1714, vol. l, Second Edition [Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985], 78). Despite the introduction of the feudal system, William 
(and his heirs) retained the Anglo-Saxon institutions of "the chancery, the chamber, 
the geld, the sheriff, the fyrd, and shire and hundred courts" (Roberts and Roberts, 85). 
This fusion of Norman and Anglo-Saxon tradition permitted the success of Norman rule 
through Henry I and produced the common law traditions to which later kings were 
held accountable. 
s2 Hollister, 141. 
SJ Hollister, 180. 
s4 Hollister, 181. 
ss Elshtain, 66. 
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our children. And when redress has been made, they shall be obedient to us as 
they were before. 56 
In other words, the barons insisted upon the legal ability not simply to censure 
their monarch, but to actively pursue their rights, and to obtain redress if their 
rights are violated. It also reinforces the reciprocal nature of the sovereign-subject 
compact by stating that once the monarch has made amends, his subjects "shall be 
obedient to us as they were before." While proscribed by Magna Carta, regicide 
would be debated as a viable option in later treatises and pamphlets, particularly 
following the rise of absolutism under the Tudor and Stuart dynasties. 
The first provision of Magna Carta states that "We have also granted to all 
freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs forever, all the liberties hereinunder 
written, to be had and held by them and their heirs ofus and our heirs."57 Included 
in these "liberties" were rights of landholding and tenancy, the right not to be 
imprisoned without cause, the right of widows not to marry without their consent, 
the rights of the cities to create their own laws, and the stipulation that the monarch 
would call together a baronial body to oversee his actions.58 
One major consequence of Magna Carta was felt immediately: a small baronial 
council was inadequate to accomplish the task ofregulating the monarchy. Under 
Henry III (1216-1272), this council grew increasingly belligerent as Henry 
attempted to seize lands and property to support his futile efforts to reclaim the 
Angevin Empire in France.59 Ultimately, Henry was forced to concede baronial 
authority following his inability to repay a papal debt in the Provisions of Oxford 
(1258) and Westminster (1259), which stipulated the inclusion of the clergy as well 
as the barons in the royal council.60 The Provisions themselves contain an explicit 
reference to the term "parliament" in conjunction with a meeting of the king 
with a specific group of councilors and elected magnates in order to "treat about 
the business of the king and kingdom."61 After a failed arbitration by the French 
King Louis IX in 1263, the barons took up arms, and in the ensuing struggle two 
notable events transpired: first, Henry's son Edward assumed increasing power 
and influence; and second, the baronial council assumed the more formal name 
and role of Parliament, arguably the most important constitutional innovation, 
after Magna Carta itself, in English rule.62 Although drawn from the Anglo-Saxon 
witan, Parliament as a legislative authority composed of both nobles and elected 
56 Brian L. Blakeley and Jacquelin Collins, eds., "Magna Carta, 1215," in Documents 
in British History: Early Times to 1714, Second Edition, vol. l, 2 vols (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1993), 67. 
57 Blakeley and Collins, 64. 
58 Blakeley and Collins, 64-67. 
59 Hollister, 236. 
60 Hollister, 238-39; Roberts and Roberts, 153. 
61 A.L. Brown, The Governance of Late Medieval England 1272-1461 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1989), 157. 
62 Hollister, 242-43. 
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representatives extended the scope of participatory governance from the nobility 
to the entire commonwealth by proxy. 
Parliament's primary role in the early years after its official inception was 
financial in nature, rather than legislative; it was convened for the purpose 
of ratifying taxation as a "representative institution," and it took this role very 
seriously, resisting royal attempts to levy taxes without what it deemed adequate 
necessity and establishing a tradition of resisting the crown, particularly in fiscal 
matters.63 By 1295, the makeup and relationship of Parliament to the king had 
altered, coming to resemble-in the aptly named "Model Parliament"-the form 
which it would take for the centuries to come, including "magnates, bishops, 
councillors, knights of the shire, burgesses from the towns, and proctors elected 
to represent the national clergy," in addition to bishops, abbots, barons, and earls.64 
During the reign of Edward II, "knights and burgesses as well as prelates, earls, 
barons and possibly representatives of the lower clergy" were all present at the 
king's deposition.65 By the first summons of Parliament under Edward III in 
1327, the commons were actively presenting petitions, "describing themselves," 
Michael Prestwich explains, "as 'the community of the land,' to the king and 
council. "66 This notion of a "community of the land" prefigures the early modem 
obsession with the idea of the "common weal" or "commonwealth," significant 
for my purposes because of its deliberate inclusion of the nation as a whole in the 
sovereign-subject compact.67 
Although during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Parliament would 
come to represent (and enact) limitations on monarchical authority, in its early 
forms it was viewed as an extension of the king's power rather than a hindrance to 
it. G.R. Elton notes that Parliament evolved as a unification of the "political and 
judicial tasks once discharged by the curia regis ['king's court']," and that "The 
original reason for calling Parliaments was not to call into being a 'counterbalance' 
or restraint, but simply that the king wanted assistance in the tasks of govemment."68 
So although the emergence of Parliament in the thirteenth century as a body 
composed of both Lords and Commons indicates progression toward a more 
unilaterally representative government, it also produced the conditions necessary 
for the emergence of absolutism in England by differentiating the monarch from 
the lords of his court. 
63 Roberts and Roberts, 153. 
64 Roberts and Roberts, 155-56. See also Hollister, 246 and Michael Prestwich, The 
Three Edwards: War and State in England 1272-1377 (London: Routledge,.1990), 119. 
65 Prestwich, 129. 
66 Prestwich, 129. 
67 See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of the origins of the term 
"commonwealth." 
68 G.R. Elton, "The Body of the Whole Realm": Parliament and Representation 
in Medieval and Tudor England, for the Jamestown Foundation of the Commonwealth 
Foundation of Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1969), 3, 16. 
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With the introduction of statute law in 1275 in the First Statute of Westminster, 
the groundwork was laid for the later limiting capacity of Parliament as a 
participatory body in English polity, and, Prestwich notes, "By 1327 they were 
initiating legislation on a large scale."69 This significant increase in power enabled 
the first legal deposition, in 1327, of an English king, Edward II, who was, it 
is worth noting, also the first monarch to have succeeded to the throne without 
baronial confirmation.70 Some of the newly introduced questions asked in his 
coronation oath indicate that Edward's subjects were skeptical from the start about 
his (un)willingness to preserve their rights: 
Sire, will you grant and keep and confirm to the people of England by your 
oath the laws and customs given them by the previous just and God-fearing 
kings, your ancestors, and particularly the laws, customs, and liberties granted 
the clergy and people by the glorious king, the sainted Edward [the Confessor], 
your predecessor? 
Sire, do you grant to be held and kept the laws and just customs which the 
community of your realm shall choose, and, to the best of your ability, defend 
and enforce them to the honor of God?71 
The emphasis on "laws and just customs" not only of Edward's ancestors, but also 
of"the community of your realm," demonstrates the degree to which participatory 
discourse was becoming a standard component of rule. The terms presented 
to Edward in his oath are the terms of the sovereign-subject compact, revised 
specifically for him in an attempt to ensure that he would uphold his duties as king. 
As several historians have noted, the fact that Parliament deposed Edward 
served as a precedent that future English kings could not ignore.72 Also of 
significance was the fact that Edward's deposition was framed as coming from 
"the whole of the political nation," as well as with "principles of both feudal and 
Roman law."73 The 1326Articles of Accusation, Starkey observes, enumerated the 
reasons for the need to remove Edward from the throne: 
The articles accused the king, the fount of justice, of a series of high crimes 
against his country. Instead of good government by good laws he had ruled by evil 
counsel. Instead of justice he had sent noblemen to shameful and illegal deaths. 
69 Helen M. Cam, Studies in the Hundred Rolls: Some Aspects of Thirteenth-Century 
Administration, vol. 6, Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History 11 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1921 ), 39; Prestwich, 135. Although Parliament began to enact and ratify statute law 
under Edward I, it was not until 1312, in the reign of Edward II, that Parliament proclaimed 
that its consent was necessary for all legislative decisions, which also required "common 
assent" in order to be ratified (Prestwich, 125-26). 
7° Figgis, 27. 
71 Qtd. in Hollister, 275. 
72 Hollister, 281-83; Prestwich, 98-99; Roberts and Roberts, 161; Starkey, Crown, 225. 
73 Prestwich, 98. 
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He had lost Scotland and Gascony and he had oppressed and impoverished 
England. In short, he had broken his coronation oath--here treated as a solemn 
contract with his people and his country-and he must pay the price.74 
17 
What is most significant about the Articles is that the responsibility for removing 
Edward became attributed to the entire communitas, not simply the barons, and 
placed the onus for Edward's downfall on the king's incompetence and his failure 
to fulfill his portion of the sovereign-subject compact. Edward's deposition 
thereby served as a precedent for direct Parliamentary intervention in all matters 
of sovereignty. 
However, despite the conflicts which arose as a consequence of disagreements 
between Parliament and the monarch, the overall relationship between the king and 
Parliament was one, Prestwich argues, "of co-operation and collaboration" rather 
than "a constant struggle."75 Even in the deposition of Edward II, as Prestwich 
notes, "no attempt was made to alter the constitutional position of the monarchy."76 
It is clear that the intention of Parliament was not to disrupt the already existing 
order of common law, but, rather, to indicate that a monarch who contravened that 
law was subject to removal and punishment enacted by the communitas within the 
extant framework of the English polity. 
Up until the English Civil War the discourse of rebellion reflected this ethos 
of correction rather than revolution; the tradition of the ancient constitution and 
limited participatory monarchy was so deeply entrenched that even the rhetoric 
of the Civil War, like nearly every rebellion (noble and common) that preceded 
it, sought to reiterate the natural rights of English citizens in nationalistic terms. 
Despite nearly six centuries of rule from Norman descent, the invocation ofAnglo-
Saxon traditions and "the Norman Yoke theory also stirred far profounder feelings 
of English patriotism and English Protestantism. Herein," notes Christopher Hill, 
"lay its strength. Men fought for the liberties of England, for the birthrights of 
Englishmen."77 This appeal to Englishness enabled the sovereign-subject compact 
to endure up to and during the Wars of the Roses, and even to temper the popular 
rhetoric of absolutism and providential divine right that arose underthe early Tudors. 
Furthermore, it is undoubtedly the pervasiveness of this chthonic Englishness that 
encouraged the rise of the English history play as a subgenre in the final decades 
of Elizabeth's reign, and which contributed to the willingness of Parliament to 
consider and then commit regicide in the name of the English Commonwealth. 
But before such a radical act of independence could be possible, the English 
tradition of common law, the ancient constitution, the sovereign-subject compact, 
and Parliament itself would be threatened by the importation of a foreign ideology 
of rule, that of absolutist divine right. By the end of Richard Il's reign in 1399, 
Parliament had come to resemble its present bicameral form, and had also 
74 Starkey, Crown, 225. 
75 Prestwich, 146. 
76 Prestwich, 99. 
77 Hill, 67. 
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become an entrenched and indispensable part of English government and national 
identity. When Richard II himself was deposed and the line of succession from 
William I fractured (for the first time), it was Parliament alone that possessed 
the unquestioned power to designate Henry IV.78 By the mid-fifteenth century, it 
was to the authority of Parliament, rather than the king, that statute and taxation 
appealed, as Elton observes: "The critical issue is the addition of the phrase 'by 
authority of Parliament'; this occurred first in 1432. It was used off and on, till 
from 1455 it became customary."79 
This was the political atmosphere that greeted the close of the fourteenth 
century and the rise of Parliament as a representative governing body with the 
capacity to tax, legislate, and render judgment, even on the king himself. By 
the beginning of the fifteenth century, Parliament had been responsible for the 
deposition of two kings-Edward II and Richard II-and had established itself 
as capable of altering the line of succession, a right it would reassert again under 
Elizabeth, when it would declare questioning its right to do so treasonous.80 The 
role of not only Parliament, but the monarch himself (or herself) would change 
dramatically with the civil unrest of the Wars of the Roses and the rise of the Tudor 
and Stuart dynasties. In the struggle to find political stability, England would begin 
to loosen its grip on the participatory traditions of the Anglo-Saxons and become 
more continental under the influence of the kings who began to espouse absolutism 
at the end of the feudal period and the desire of the nation as a whole for clarity 
and stability in succession. 
78 Starkey, Crown, 243. 
79 Elton, Body, 15. 
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